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FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF 
CONSCRIPTION IN BRITAIN, 1938-1939 
 
ABSTRACT - This article examines the relationship interaction between the French campaign for the 
introduction of British conscription during 1938-39 and the ebbs and flows of British public opinion on 
the same issue. In particular, it will demonstrate how French pressure for conscription varied in intensity 
depending on their perceptions of British opinion on the subject. It was this interaction between 
diplomatic and domestic pressures that ultimately compelled the British government to introduce 
conscription in April 1939. Furthermore, the issue of conscription also sheds light on the wider issue of 
Franco-%ULWLVKUHODWLRQVUHYHDOLQJKRZ)UHQFKIRUHLJQSROLF\ZDVQHLWKHUGLFWDWHGE\DQ¶(QJOLVK
*RYHUQHVV·QRUSXUVXHGLQGHSHQGHQWOy of Great Britain. 
 
 
When Neville Chamberlain announced the introduction of conscription to the House of 
Commons on 26 April 1939 he not only reneged on previous promises but deviated 
from the traditional British aversion to peacetime compulsory service. Chamberlain 
defended himself by arguing that current international tensions could not be described as 
¶SHDFH-WLPHLQDQ\VHQVHLQZKLFKWKHWHUPFRXOGIDLUO\EHXVHG·1 Nonetheless, 
introducing conscription ² albeit in a limited form2 ² was alien to British tradition. How, 
therefore, can the decision be explained? What motivated the government to take such a 
step? This article sheds new light on the British decision to implement conscription in 
April 1939, moving beyond existing analyses by showing that the decision was motivated 
not only by a fusion of domestic and international pressures but by the interaction of the 
two. More specifically, contends that French pressure for British conscription ebbed and 
IORZHGLQGLUHFWFRUUHODWLRQWRWKH)UHQFKJRYHUQPHQW·VSHUFHSWLRQVRIthe British 
public·VDWWLWXGHtowards compulsory military service. In particular, the growing public 
demand for conscription both in the immediate aftermath of the September 1938 
Munich Agreement and again after the German occupation of the rump Czech state in 
March 1939 encouraged the French to intensify their official interventions.  
In addition, the conscription question can be XVHGDVD¶FRUHVDPSOH·ZLWKZKLFK
to analyse the wider issue of Franco-British relations during the final months of peace.3 
                                                 
1 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, 346 House of Commons Debates, col. 1152. 
2 The form of conscription introduced applied only to men aged 20 and 21. 
3 This use of D¶FRUHVDPSOH·ERUURZVIURP.HLWK1HLOVRQZKRXVHV$QJOR-6RYLHWUHODWLRQVDVD¶FRUH
VDPSOH·IRUDQDO\VLQJWKHZLGHU issue of British strategic foreign policy in the inter-war years. Britain, the 
Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Versailles Settlement, 1919-1941, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
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)UHQFKSUHVVXUHIRUFRQVFULSWLRQFHUWDLQO\VKRZVWKDWWKHQRWLRQRIDQ¶(QJOLVK
*RYHUQHVV·GRHVQRWVWDQGXSWRVFUXWLQ\4 However, the counter argument is also 
SUREOHPDWLF7DOERW,POD\·VVXJJHVWLRQWKDW)UDQFHDGRSWHGDpolitique de fermeté 
independently of Britain is persuasive but not clear-cut.5 7KHFRQVFULSWLRQ¶FRUHVDPSOH·
reveals that the reality was more ambiguous: although the French government 
undoubtedly became more assertive, it did not act entirely independently of Britain, 
always paying careful attention to British public opinion. Reports from the London 
embassy during 1938-9 indicated that British public opinion was sympathetic to the 
firmer foreign policy adopted by Paris and, moreover, was prepared to increase the 
degree of British commitment to France, even at the cost of conscription.  
    
I 
 
&KDPEHUODLQ·VGHFLVLRQWRLQWURGXFHFRQVFULSWLRQLQ$SULOKDVEHHQDWWULEXWHGWR
French demands, domestic pressures, or a combination of the two. Talbot Imlay and 
Anthony Adamthwaite both suggest that French pressure was critical, whilst N. J. 
Crowson and Michael Dockrill emphasise the increased demands from within the 
Conservative Party 6. For Peter Dennis&KDPEHUODLQ·VGHFLVLRQZDVVLPXOWDQHRXVO\¶D
SROLWLFDOJHVWXUHWRWKH)UHQFK·DQGDUHVSRQVHWRJURZLQJSUHVVDQGSDUOLDPHQWDU\
pressure at home. %ULDQ%RQGFRQFXUVVXJJHVWLQJWKDW&KDPEHUODLQZDV¶REOLJHGWRERZ
WRWKHVHFRPELQHGGLSORPDWLFDQGGRPHVWLFSUHVVXUHV·7 However, neither Dennis nor 
Bond attempt to tease out the links between French pressure and the British press and 
political campaign for conscription during 1938-9. This article seeks to do just that, 
LOOXVWUDWLQJKRZ)UDQFH·VGHPDQGIRUD%ULWLVK ¶HIIRUWGXVDQJ·Zas contingent upon their 
                                                 
4 )RUPRUHRQWKHQRWLRQRIDQ¶(QJOLVK*RYHUQHVV·FRQWUROling the direction of French foreign policy, see 
)UDQoRLV%pGDULGD¶/D´JRXYHUQDQWHDQJODLVHµ·LQ5HQp5pPRQGDQG-DQLQH%RXUGLQHGVÉdouard 
Daladier, chef de gouvernement : avril 1938-septembre 1939, (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1977), 228-240, and John 
Herman, The Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and the Foreign Office, 1937-1939, 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 90-93. 
5 7DOERW,POD\¶7KH0DNLQJRIWKH$QJOR-French Alliance, 1938-·LQ0DUWLQ6$OH[DQGHUDQG:LOOLam J. 
Philpott, eds., Anglo-French Defence Relations Between the Wars, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 92-
120. 
6 Imlay, Facing the Second World War, 92; Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, 
1936-1939, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 245-263; N. J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the 
European Dictators, 1935-1940, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 147-LGHP¶7KH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\DQG
the Call for National Service, 1937-39: Compulsion versus VoluntarLVP·Contemporary Record, 9:3 (1995), 
507-528; Michael Dockrill, British Establishment Perspectives on France, 1936-40, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999), 133. 
7 Peter Dennis, Decision by Default: Peacetime Conscription and British Defence, 1919-1939 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1972), 2; Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), 308-9. 
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perceptions of British public opinion. That is, official French interventions regarding 
conscription were timed carefully to exploit a seemingly favourable climate of British 
public opinion. 
During 1938-9, British public opinion became increasingly favourable towards 
peacetime conscription, especially after the Munich Agreement and after Hitler marched 
into Prague in March 1939. Simultaneously, the French government became more 
assertive, stepping up their efforts to secure a greater British military commitment to the 
continent. Crucially there is compelling circumstantial evidence to suggest that these 
efforts were inspired, at least in part, by perceptions of British public and press opinion. 
After Munich, reports from the French ambassador in London, Charles Corbin, 
LQGLFDWHGJURZLQJSXEOLFVXSSRUWIRUFRQVFULSWLRQ&RUELQ·VIUequent reports, which 
IRUPHGWKHEDVLVRIWKH4XDLG·2UVD\·VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI%ULWLVKRSLQLRQZHUHEDVHG
largely on a reading of a cross-section of the mainstream British press. During the 
autumn of 1938, Corbin rightly noted that the conservative newspapers, notably those 
owned by Lord Beaverbrook, urged the introduction of conscription. Interestingly, this 
press campaign undermines the argument that the National Government manipulated 
the press, as several conservative journals had few qualms about canvassing support for a 
policy that Chamberlain clearly opposed.8 Unsurprisingly, Paris detected a fissure 
between the British government and public, thus encouraging the French government to 
intensify their official pressure for London to introduce conscription. 
The French campaign for British conscription has already been well-documented, 
and British VRXUFHVFHUWDLQO\VXSSRUW,POD\·VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWFRQVFULSWLRQZDV¶DLPHGLQ
ODUJHSDUWDWUHDVVXULQJWKH)UHQFK·9 The foreign office feared that failing to introduce 
compulsory service might prove disastrous for French morale, even causing the French 
side of the entente to collapse altogether. On 1 November 1938, the foreign secretary, 
Lord Halifax, warned the British ambassador in Paris, Sir Eric Phipps, that France might 
HYHQ¶turn so defeatist as to give up the struggle of maintaining adequate defences even 
IRUWKHVDIHW\RI0HWURSROLWDQ)UDQFH·10 In light of such fears, conscription was seen as a 
means for assuaging French concerns, providing tangible proof of a British continental 
commitment. However, impetus for conscription was not confined to official diplomatic 
                                                 
8 7KHDUJXPHQWWKDW&KDPEHUODLQ·VJRYHUQPHQWPDQLSXODWHGWKHSUHVVKDVEHHQPDGHE\5LFKDUG&RFNHWW
Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement & the Manipulation of the Press, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
DQG$QWKRQ\$GDPWKZDLWH¶7KH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKH0HGLD-·Journal of 
Contemporary History, 18:2 (1983), 281-297. 
9 Imlay, Facing the Second World War, 92. 
10 Halifax to Phipps, 1 Nov. 1938, The National Archives (TNA), FO 800/311. 
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pressure from France, as the press campaign in Britain clearly revealed. Indeed, as 
0LFKDHO+RZDUGKDVDUJXHG%ULWDLQ·VLQFUHDVLQJO\FRQWLQHQWDORXWORRN¶GLGQRWRXWUXQ
SXEOLFRSLQLRQ·11 
That British opinion was apparently one step ahead of their government with 
regard to conscription was certainly noted by the French embassy in London. Of course, 
one must acknowledge that embassy staff had ulterior motives for portraying a growing 
desire in Britain to resist the dictators by force, particularly after Munich. As Yvon 
/DFD]HKDVDUJXHG&RUELQ¶VRXJKWWRGLVFHUQDQHYROXWLRQLQ%ULWLVKRSLQLRQWRZDUGV
ILUPQHVV·WKXVKHOSLQJWRVWUHQJWKHQWKHKDQGRI those in Paris who favoured a policy of 
UHVLVWDQFHRYHUIRUHLJQPLQLVWHU*HRUJHV%RQQHW·VSROLF\RIUHWUHDW12 Indeed, Corbin was 
hostile to appeasement and, as John Herman has noted, this conviction was strengthened 
E\KLVIULHQGVKLS¶ZLWK&KXUFKLOO(GHQ$PHU\'XII&RRSHUDQGHVSHFLDOO\9DQVLWWDUW·13 
In addition, any indication of a growing firmness in Britain helped alleviate concerns 
regarding domestic opinion in France. Throughout the summer of 1938, French opinion 
had become increasingly anxious about the degree of support that would be forthcoming 
from Britain in the event of a Franco-German conflict. As Lacaze has remarked, French 
newspapers during the critical weeks of September 1938 ¶LQVLVWHGPRUHWKDQHYHURQWKH
Franco-%ULWLVKHQWHQWH·14 
To be sure, the French embassy represented British public opinion in such a way 
as to undermine appeasement and assuage the anxieties of public opinion in France. 
Nevertheless, this must not blind us to the fact that British opinion after Munich was 
evolving dramatically in favour of compulsory national service. As recently as the start of 
1938, longstanding British hostility to continental entanglements continued to suggest 
that a large-scale continental force was both unnecessary and impractical. Furthermore, 
memories of the last war rendered the public suspicious of sending troops to the 
continent, evoking Paschendaele and the Somme, and the slaughter of hundreds of 
                                                 
11 0LFKDHO+RZDUGKDVDUJXHGWKDW%ULWDLQ·VLQFUHDVLQJO\FRQWLQHQWDORXWORRN¶GLGQRWRXWUXQSXEOLF
RSLQLRQ·The Continental Commitment: The Dilemmas of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars, 
(London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), 121-46. 
12
 <YRQ/DFD]H¶'DODGLHU%RQQHWDQGWKH'HFLVLRQ-0DNLQJ3URFHVVGXULQJWKH0XQLFK&ULVLV·LQ
Robert Boyce (ed.), French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940: The decline and fall of a great power, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 227. For more on the orientation of French foreign policy after Munich, see ,POD\¶7KH
Making of the Anglo-)UHQFK$OOLDQFH·-DQG5REHUW<RXQJ¶7KH$IWHUPDWKRI0XQLFK7KH Course 
of French Diplomacy, October 1938 ² 0DUFK·French Historical Studies, Vol. 8 no. 2 (1973), 305-322. 
13
 John Herman, The Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and the Foreign Office, 1937-1939, 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 27. The anti-appeasement stance of the French Embassy in 
/RQGRQDOVRFRPHVDFURVVLQ*LUDUGGH&KDUERQQLqUH·VLes plus évitable de toutes les guerres, (Paris: Albatros, 
1985). 
14
 Lacaze, /·RSLQLRQSXEOLTXHIUDQoDLVHHWODFULVHGH0XQLFK,  259. 
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WKRXVDQGVRI\RXQJPHQ¶1RPRUH6RPPHV·ZDVWKHZDWFKZRUGLQWKHLQWHUZDU
period.15 British strategy did not, however, overlook continental Europe.16 Indeed, the 
advent of Nazism demanded that Britain take her continental commitment seriously. As 
the then prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, told the Commons in July 1934: ¶:KHQ\RX
think of the defence of England you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you 
WKLQNRIWKH5KLQH·17 Moreover, advancements in aerial warfare directly threatened 
%ULWDLQ·VVHFXULW\XQGHUPLQLQJWKHVHFXULW\SURYLGHGE\LVODQGVWDWXV7KHLQWHJULW\RI
France and the Low Countries was therefore crucial for Britain; should these countries 
fall into hostile hands, aerial raids on Britain would be increasingly damaging and 
frequent.18   
1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHFRQFHSWRI¶OLPLWHGOLDELOLW\·SUHYDLOHGLQWKHPLG-1930s.19 The 
National Government embraced this viewpoint, while the Labour opposition had always 
been hostile to large-scale continental commitments.20 Moreover, a latent distrust of 
France continued to inform perceptions. )RUPDQ\LQ%ULWDLQ)UDQFH·VTXHVWIRUsécurité 
was an almost paranoid obsession, and French intransigence was often considered to 
have legitimized German revanchism.21 There was also a growing awareness that modern 
warfare had progressed since 1914-18, and that military doctrine must adapt accordingly. 
The size of the army was no longer paramount, as technological advancements meant 
that future conflicts would be decided not by sheer volume of troops but by their 
mobility and standard of equipment. Therefore, a small professional army, equipped to 
the most advanced standards of the day, was potentially more potent than a large, ill-
equipped and inadequately trained conscript force.22  
                                                 
15 :LOOLDP3KLOSRWW¶7KH*HQHUDO6WDIIDQGWKH3DUDGR[HVRI&RQWLQHQWDO:DU·LQ'DYLG)UHQFKDQG%ULDQ
Holden Reid, eds., The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, c.1890-1939, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 
95-111. 
16 -3+DUULV¶7KH%ULWLVK*HQHUDl Staff and the Coming of War, 1933-·LQ)UHQFKDQG+ROGHQ5HLG
eds., The British General Staff, 175-191, at 190. 
17 Cited in Bond, British Military Policy, 209. 
18 +DUULV¶7KH%ULWLVK*HQHUDO6WDIIDQGWKH&RPLQJRI:DU-·-91.   
19 Howard, The Continental Commitment, 96-120; Bond, British Military Policy, 209-29. 
20 -HUU\+%URRNVKLUH¶´6SHDNIRU(QJODQGµ$FWIRU(QJODQG/DERXU·V/HDGHUVKLSDQG%ULWLVK1DWLRQDO
6HFXULW\8QGHUWKH7KUHDWRI:DULQWKH/DWHV·European History Quarterly, Vol. 29, no. 2 (1999), 251-
87. 
21 In late 1935, Sir Henry Pownall, argued that German revanchism FRXOGKDYHEHHQDYRLGHGKDGVKH¶EHHQ
properly treated and allowed some revision of at least the disarmament clauses of the Treaty. But the chief 
blame for thHIDLOXUHWRGRWKDWPXVWVXUHO\OLHZLWKWKH)UHQFK·&LWHGLQ%ULDQ%RQGHGChief of Staff: The 
Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, vol. 1, 1933-1940, (London: L. Cooper, 1972), 55. More 
generally, French preponderance in continental Europe power upset the British strategy of maintaining a 
EDODQFHRISRZHU6HH%-&0F.HUFKHU¶7KH)RUHLJQ2IILFH-39: Strategy, Permanent Interests and 
1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\·Contemporary British History, Vol. 18, no. 3 (2004), 87-109, at 95. 
22 David French, 5DLVLQJ&KXUFKLOO·V$UP\7KH%ULWLVK$UP\DQGWKH:DU$JDLQVW*HUPDQ\-1945, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 15. 
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These factors underpinned the concept of limited liability, and Chamberlain was 
a committed advocate. In March 1937, he was conviQFHGWKDW¶ZHVKDOOQHYHUDJDLQVHQG
to the continent an army on the scale of that which we put into the field in the Great 
:DU· &KDPEHUODLQ·VDSSRLQWHHDVZDUPLQLVWHU/HVOLH+RUH-%HOLVKDFRQFXUUHG¶RXU
army should be organised to defend this country and the empire . . ., to organise it with a 
PLOLWDU\SUHSRVVHVVLRQLQIDYRXURIDFRQWLQHQWDOFRPPLWPHQWLVZURQJ·23 In a defence 
paper in February 1938, Hore-%HOLVKDUHFRPPHQGHGWKDW¶RXUDOOLHVVKRXOGEHOHIWLQQR
doubt as to the possibilities of direct DVVLVWDQFHRQRXUSDUW·24 8QGHU&KDPEHUODLQ·V
SUHPLHUVKLSWKHFRQFHSWRI¶OLPLWHGOLDELOLW\·DSSHDUHGWRKDYHUHDFKHGLWV]HQLWK,QGHHG
0LFKDHO+RZDUGKDVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHFRQFHSWKDGHVVHQWLDOO\EHFRPHDSROLF\¶RIQR
OLDELOLW\DWDOO·25 Such was the British position by the time Édouard Daladier formed a 
new French government in April 1938. For Daladier, with his wealth of experience at the 
French war ministry, obtaining further British military assistance in the event of war was 
essential. 
 
II 
 
In February 1938, the chief of the French general staff, Maurice Gamelin summarized 
the British military commitment to France. In the event of a European war, he noted, 
%ULWLVKDVVLVWDQFHZRXOGEH¶LQVLJQLILFDQWPRUHRUOHVVIURPWKHVWDUW·26 Consequently, 
'DODGLHU·VIRUWKFRPLQJYLVLWWR/RQGRQLQ$SULOwas seen in Paris as an opportunity 
WRDVN%ULWDLQWRWDNH¶PHDVXUHVSHUPLWWLQJWKHPWRGHVSDWFKDQH[SHGLWLRQDU\IRUFHLQ
SURSRUWLRQWRWKHLUSRSXODWLRQ·HYHQDW¶WKHFRVWRIFRQVFULSWLRQ·.27 The British 
government, however, were obdurate. As Duff Cooper remarked in his diary, the cabinet 
had decideGWR¶WHOOWKH)UHQFKWKDWWKHSURVSHFWRIRXUVHQGLQJDIRUFHWRWKHFRQWLQHQW
LQWKHHYHQWRIZDULVWRRUHPRWHWREHZRUWKGLVFXVVLQJ·28 Consequently, Halifax re-
                                                 
23 Chamberlain to Liddell-Hart, 8 Mar. 1937, cited in Alex Danchev, Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil 
Liddell-Hart, (London: Phoenix Giant, 1999), 191; Hore-Belisha to Chamberlain, 23 Nov. 1937, cited in 
Bond, British Military Policy, 253. 
24 ¶7KH2UJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH$UP\IRULWVU{OHLQZDU·&DELQHWSDSHUE\+RUH-Belisha, 10 Feb. 1938, TNA, 
WO 33/1502. 
25 Howard, The Continental Commitment, 117. 
26 *DPHOLQWR'DODGLHU¶/HVGRQQpHVDFWXHOOHVGXSUREOqPHPLOLWDLUHIUDQoDLVH·)HE$UFKLYHV
Nationales (AN), Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/30, 4 DA 3 dr. 1 sdra. 
27 Note sur la collaboration militaire franco-britannique, 24 Apr. 1938, AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/35, 4 
DA 8 Dr. 3 sdrb. 
28 John Julius Norwich (ed.), The Duff Cooper Diaries, 1915-1951, (London: Phoenix, 2006), diary entry for 22 
Apr. 1938, 246. 
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iterated to the French that Britain could only contribute two divisions.29 The French 
voiced little dissent. Not only had British obstinacy had left little room for manoeuvre, 
but British public opinion endorsed WKHLUJRYHUQPHQW·VSRVLWLRQ$V&RUbin noted, the 
British press remained ¶DODUPHG·E\WKHSURVSHFWRISHDFHWLPHFRQVFULSWLRQ30   
 However, the rapid evolution of international events in 1938 forced the British 
public to re-evaluate continental commitments. The Czechoslovakian crisis exposed 
British military shortcomings, which were readily acknowledged to have contributed to 
the Munich capitulation. The Daily Mail ZDUQHGWKDWZRUNPXVWEHGRQHVRWKDW¶QRJDSV
UHPDLQWREHILOOHGDWWKHODVWPRPHQW·31 Cabinet members perceived a change in the 
public mood. The home secretary, Sir John Simon, detected a increased willingness to 
VHUYHWKHSXEOLFQRZUHDOLVLQJ¶WKHH[WHQWRIWKHVDFULILFHWKDWPXVWEHPDGHIRU
%ULWDLQ·32 The specific issue of conscription was also raised, particularly in the 
Beaverbrook newspapers. The Daily Express argued that Chamberlain must ¶change his 
YLHZVRQFRQVFULSWLRQ·ZKLOVW'XII&RRSHUZKRUHVLJQHGIURPWKHFDELQHWLQSURWHVWDW
Munich, wrote in the Evening Standard WKDW¶FRQVFULSWLRQLVWKHFU\WKDWOHDSVWRDOOPHQ·V
PRXWKV·33 For Beaverbrook, there was no contradiction between advocating isolationism 
and FRQVFULSWLRQ¶7KH,VRODWLRQLVWVKDYHDOZD\VVXSSRUWHGSUHSDUDWLRQVIRUGHIHQFH·KH
ZURWHWRRQHRIKLVPDQ\FRUUHVSRQGHQWV¶DQGWKH,VRODWLRQLVWVDUHLQIDYRXU of 
FRPSXOVRU\PLOLWDU\VHUYLFHIRUWKH\RXWKRIWKHFRXQWU\·34  
Elsewhere in the press, a Daily Mail ballot revealed that a majority favoured 
conscription in the immediate aftermath of Munich, although opinion became more 
divided as tensions eased in subsequent days. 35 Nevertheless, a poll conducted by the 
British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO), published in The News Chronicle on 19 
October, showed 78% in favour of a national register, including the majority of 
opposition supporters. As Corbin reported, the press campaign was echoed in 
Parliament, with DJURZLQJFODPRXUIRU¶LIQRWFRQVFULSWLRQSXUHDQGVLPSOHDWOHDVWD
IRUPRI´QDWLRQDOVHUYLFHµ· Furthermore, remarked Corbin, the BIPO poll indicated that 
                                                 
29 Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), 3rd ser., I, no. 164. 
30 Corbin to Bonnet, 5 Jun. 1938, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Série Z, Grande-Bretagne, no. 
237. 
31 Daily Mail, editorial, 3 Oct. 1938. 
32 339 H. C. Deb. 5s, col. 308. 
33 Daily Express, editorial, 7 Oct. 1938; Duff Cooper, Evening Standard, 19 Oct. 1938.   
34 Beaverbrook to James Agate, 5 Oct. 1938, Beaverbrook Papers, House of Lords Record Office, 
BBK/B/292. 
35 The Daily Mail launched the ballot on 12 Oct. 1938, and published the results on 28 Oct. 1938. The Daily 
Mail avoided stating an editorial prHIHUHQFHPHUHO\VHHNLQJWR¶JDLQWKRVHRSLQLRQV>RIWKHLUUHDGHUV@DQG
SUHVHQWWKHZHLJKWRIWKHPWRWKHDXWKRULWLHV·2FW 
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WKHPDMRULW\RIWKHSXEOLFZHUH¶IDYourable to the rapid organisation of a national 
UHJLVWHU·36 French hopes were raised that the British government would now enhance 
their level of commitment to France, and Paris thus seized the opportunity to intensify 
their official interventions advocating the introduction of conscription.   
One particularly effective way of stressing the need for enhanced British 
commitment was perpetuating British fears of French defeatism, convincing London that 
the lack of British support unsettled French public opinion. Of course, this was not 
entirely fabrication, as Phipps was quite accurate in reporting that the French press had, 
throughout the Czechoslovakian crisis, unanimously ¶GHFODUHGWKDW$QJOR-French co-
RSHUDWLRQZDVHVVHQWLDO·37 Furthermore, there were compelling political and military 
imperatives for ensuring effective co-operation between the two democracies. At the 
Radical party congress in late October, Georges Bonnet declared the cornerstone of his 
foreign policy to be the Franco-British alliance,38 whilst a conseil supérieur de la défense 
nationale &6'1QRWHRI2FWREHUFRQFOXGHGWKDW)UDQFHPXVWEH¶LQFORVHDFFRUG
with Britain· in order to ¶RSSRVHIXUWKHU*HUPDQVWULNHVLQ(DVWHUQ(XURSH·39 For 
Phipps, French attitudes to the entente bordered on desperation. France, he reported, 
¶DWWDFKHVDOPRVWSDWKHWLFLPSRUWDQFH·WR%ULWDLQ40 
3KLSSV·VFRPPHQWVUHIOHFWHGDJURZLQJIHDUZLWKLQ%ULWLVKGLSORPDWLFFLUFOHV ² 
partly fostered by Paris - that French opinion was flirting with isolationism and even 
defeatism. Further concerns surfaced in a memorandum by the British military attaché in 
Paris, Colonel William Fraser, reporting the views of Général Henri Dentz, the deputy 
chief of the French general staff. Almost certainly aware of the growing press demand in 
Britain for conscription, Dentz seized the opportunity to heighten British fears of 
potential French isolationism. Britain, he warned, PXVW¶WDNHFDUHRI)UHQFKSXEOLF
opinion. France does not intend to allow Britain to fight her battles with French soldiHUV·
,QWKHIRUHLJQRIILFHDODUPEHOOVZHUHULQJLQJ¶:HPXVW·ZDUQHG+DOLID[¶EHFDUHIXOWR
NHHSWKH)UHQFKYHU\FORVH·41  
                                                 
36 Corbin to Bonnet, 13 Oct. and 24 Oct. 1938, MAE, Série Z, Grande-Bretagne, no. 280. 
37 Phipps to Halifax, 3 Oct. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21767/C11502/4770/18. 
38 %RQQHW·VVSHHFKWRWKH5DGLFDO3DUW\&RQJUHVV2FWFLWHGLQLe Temps, 30 Oct. 1938. 
39 CSDN, ¶Note sur la situation actuelle·2FW6HUYLFH+LVWRULTXHGHO·$UPpHGH7HUUe (SHAT), 
5N 579, dossier 1. I am grateful to Lora Gibson of the University of Aberystwyth for the reference to this 
document. 
40 Phipps to Halifax, 10 Nov. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21603/C13846/101/17. 
41 Memorandum by Colonel Fraser, 12 Oct. 1938; Orme-Sargent minute, 21 Oct. 1938; Halifax minute, 23 
Oct. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21785/C12144/11169/18. See also Herman, The Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps, 
133-4. 
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'HQW]·VZDUQLQJVZHUHQRWLVRODWHGZLWKUHSRUWVIURPWKH3DULVHPEDVV\DQG
QXPHURXV%ULWLVKFRQVXOVHYRNLQJ¶XQGHUFXUUHQWVRIGHIHDWLVP·42 For Halifax, a trip to 
Paris in late November was essential, if only to reassure the French. Direct conversations 
with the British prime minister and foreign secretary offered the French ministers 
DQRWKHURSSRUWXQLW\¶WRDVN*UHDW%ULWDLQWRLQtensify and accelerate her military effort·
particularly vis-à-vis ¶KHUODQGIRUFHVIRUWKHFRQWLQHQW·43 Encouraged by post-Munich 
British press commentary, Corbin urged Paris not to allow Chamberlain to evade the 
LVVXH¶0XVWZHZDLWVL[PRQWKV·DVNHG&RUELQ¶DVLQIRUWKH´ILUVWKXQGUHG
WKRXVDQGµWRPDNHWKHLUDSSHDUDQFHRQRXUVRLO"· By contrast, the French military attaché 
in London, Général Lelong, was unconvinced that British opinion had evolved so 
dramatically, reminding Paris that many in Britain considered conscription unnecessary, 
UHWDLQLQJDQDOPRVWLOOXVRU\IDLWKLQ)UHQFKGHIHQVLYHFDSDELOLWLHV¶7KH\WKLQNWKDWWKH
French army, supported by the Maginot Line, must be capable of holding . . . 
LQGHILQLWHO\·44      
Nevertheless, Lelong concurred with Corbin that France must demand a greater 
military contribution from Britain, perhaps motivated by the attitude of the British 
General Staff. As Imlay has noted, Major-General Sir Henry Pownall, the Director of 
Military Operations and Intelligence, instructed )UDVHU¶WRSURPSWWKH)UHQFKWRSUHVV
WKHLVVXHRIWKH%()·VVL]HGXULQJWKHYLVLWRIWKH%ULWLVKPLQLVWHUV·45 Daladier duly did 
so, arguing WKDWWZRGLYLVLRQVZHUHZKROO\LQDGHTXDWH¶0RUHGLYLVLRQVZHUHQHHGHG·KH
DUJXHG¶DQGDVIDUDVSRVVLEOHWKH\VKRXOGEHPRWRULVHG·+LVDSSHDO, however, fell on 
deaf ears, Chamberlain quickly retorting that home defence must remain the British 
priority.46 7KHSULPHPLQLVWHU·V intransigence caused frustration on both sides of the 
channel. Pownall, who had hoped that Chamberlain and Halifax would return from Paris 
¶PRUHUHFHSWLYHWRWKHLGHDRIVHQGLQJWURRSVWR)UDQFH·VXEVHTXHQWO\ lamented that the 
French had not pressed harder.47 
 
                                                 
42 Phipps to Halifax, 12 Oct. 1938, DBFP, 3rd ser., I, no. 187; Report from the British Consul in Bordeaux, 
13 Oct. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21613/C12852/1050/17. 
43 3o %XUHDX1RWHFRQFHUQDQWOHVGHPDQGHVjSUpVHQWHUDX*RXYHUQHPHQWEULWDQQLTXHjO·DFWLRQPLOLWDLUH
terrestre, 23 Nov. 1938; Note, Section de Défense nationale, 22 Nov. 1938, AN, Fonds Daladier 496 
AP/11, 2 DA 4 Dr. 2, sdra. 
44 Corbin to Bonnet, 8 Nov. 1938, AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/10, 2 DA 4 Dr. 3, sdra; /HORQJ¶eWXGH
VXUODSDUWLFLSDWLRQGHO·$QJOHWHUUHGDQVO·pYHQWXDOLWpG·XQHDFWLRQFRPPXQHIUDQFR-britannique en cas de 
JXHUUH·1RY$1)RQGV'aladier, 496 AP/35, 4 DA 8 Dr. 3 sdrb. 
45 ,POD\¶7KH0DNLQJRIWKH$QJOR-)UHQFK$OOLDQFH· 
46 Record of Anglo-French Conversations, 24 Nov. 1938, DBFP, 3rd ser., III, no. 325. 
47 Bond, ed., Chief of Staff, diary entries for 14 and 28 Nov. 1938, 170-1.  
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III 
 
In choosing not to press too hard ² at least for the moment ² the French had one eye on 
British opinion. As tensions eased after Munich, press discussion of conscription waned, 
and those newspapers most favourable to conscription were also opposed to a large 
expeditionary force. Moreover, the spectre of French defeatism perpetuated the image of 
a fractured and divided country, playing into the hands of the isolationists who 
questioned the wisdom of committing British forces to the defence of France. For the 
Daily Express, such a commitment ZDVDNLQWR¶SOHGJLQJWKHZKROH\RXWKRI*UHDW%ULWDLQ
WRDZDUIRU)UDQFH·VIURQWLHUV·The Daily Mirror was similarly sceptical¶:KDWanother big 
army of fine young men for idiotic and arrogant dud generals to drive to death and 
destrXFWLRQ"· The anticipated leftist opposition was also freely expressed, the far-left 
repeating the old arguments that military conscription would be the precursor to 
industrial conscription. The Daily Worker FODLPHGWKDWWKH¶ZRUNLQJFODVVRI%ULWDLQZLOO
nRWVXEPLWWREHUHJLPHQWHGZKLOHFDSLWDOLVWVDUHOHIWIUHHWRSLFNRXUSRFNHWV·48 
Furthermore, an upsurge in French domestic unrest, culminating in the general strike of 
30 November, undermined British confidence in her ally. As Corbin warned, the French 
dRPHVWLFVLWXDWLRQ¶FDQQRWEHDQH[FXVHIRU*UHDW%ULWDLQWROLPLWKHUFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH
system of Franco-%ULWLVKGHIHQFH·49   
Nevertheless, sections of the British government were more amenable to 
conscription. Halifax recommended a compulsory register to the cabinet on 14 
November, impressed by intelligence reports suggesting that such a measure would 
impress Hitler.50 $OWKRXJK&KDPEHUODLQ·VFRXQWHU-argument - that it would be of little 
practical value ² prevailed, reports of potential French defeatism reverberated. Phipps 
QRWHGD¶ZLGHVSUHDGSURSDJDQGDLQ)UDQFH>«@WRWKHHIIHFWWKDWLQDPDMRUHPHUJHQF\
)UDQFHFDQRQO\UHO\RQ*UHDW%ULWDLQ´WRILJKWWRWKHODVW)UHQFKPDQµ·51 At the same 
time, the French government intensified their efforts to extract a declaration of Franco-
%ULWLVKVROLGDULW\)RU3DULVWKHVKRXWVRI¶&RUVLFD7XQLV1LFH·LQWKH,WDOLDQ&KDPEHU
on 30 November reinforced the need for further British assurances. Moreover, the 
                                                 
48 Daily Express, editorial, 26 Nov. 1938; Daily Mirror, 26 Nov. 1938; Daily Worker, editorial, 28 Oct. 1938.   
49 Corbin to Bonnet, 26 Nov. 1938, MAE, Série Z, Grande-Bretagne, no. 291. 
50 +LWOHUZDVDOOHJHGWRKDYHFODLPHG¶,IWKH(QJOLVKKDYHQRWJRWXQLYersal conscription by the spring of 
WKH\PD\FRQVLGHUWKHLUZRUOGHPSLUHDVORVW·&DELQHW&RPPLWWHHRQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\1RY
TNA, CAB 27/624. 
51 Phipps report on the present situation in France (prior to the visit to Paris of Chamberlain and Halifax), 
16 Nov. 1938, TNA, FO 371/21600/C14025/55/17. 
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Italian demands appeared to unite French opinion, persuading London that French 
domestic unrest was dissipating, persuading even the isolationists that France was an ally 
worthy of increased British support.  
7KH)UHQFKJRYHUQPHQW·VILUPUHVSRQVHWRWKH,WDOLDQGHPDQGVZDVDV-HDQ-
Baptiste Duroselle notes, approveGE\¶WKHTXDVL-XQDQLPLW\RI)UHQFKSXEOLFRSLQLRQ·52 
Coupled with the relative failure of the general strike, the societal upheaval of previous 
years gave way to increased unity, which was warmly welcomed by the British press.53 
+RZHYHU&KDPEHUODLQ·VVWDQce remained worrying. When news emerged that 
Chamberlain intended to visit Rome in January, many in France suspected that he was 
seeking to mediate to the detriment of French interests.54 &KDPEHUODLQ·VLQWHQWLRQVZHUH
also questioned at home, where many werHFRQYLQFHGWKDW%ULWDLQ·VSULRULW\PXVWEH
assuaging French concerns rather than appeasing Mussolini.55 Duff Cooper argued that 
%ULWDLQPXVWEHFDSDEOHRISXWWLQJ¶LQWRWKHILHOGDUHVSHFWDEOHDUPRIDWOHDVWWHQRU
twelve divisions within a month or two oIWKHRXWEUHDNRIZDU·Vansittart concurred, 
ZDUQLQJ+DOLID[RI¶DYHU\ZLGH-spread feeling of discontent with us in France·56  
9DQVLWWDUW·VYLHZVZHUHOHQWFUHGHQFHE\)UDVHU·VUHSRUWRI'HFHPEHUZDUQLQJ
of the persistent French suspicion that Britain sought ¶to fight her battles on the 
FRQWLQHQWZLWK)UHQFKVROGLHUV·7KHIROORZLQJGD\KHFRQYH\HGWKHFRQFHUQVRIWKH
)UHQFKJHQHUDOVWDIIUHJDUGLQJ¶RXUUHIXVDOWRDFFHSWWKHQHFHVVLW\IRUKDYLQJDQHIIHFWLYH
DUP\·57 In Paris, Bonnet again played the defeatism card¶LWZRXOGEHGUHDGIXOIRUWKH
morale of the French army for Frenchmen to feel that they would be alone for so long 
EHIRUHKDYLQJWKHVXSSRUWRIWKHLUDOOLHV·58 A fusion of such reports, coupled with 
representations of a British public opinion increasingly keen to strengthen the Anglo-
French alliance, added impetus to arguments in favour of compulsory service. In early 
1939, rumours of an imminent German strike in Western Europe had even more telling 
repercussions. 
                                                 
52 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La décadence, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1979), 391. 3KLSSVUHSRUWHGKRZ¶,
have never known French public opinion so unanimous as it is against Italy·3KLSSVWR+DOLID['HF
1938, TNA, FO 371/23791/R55/7/22.   
53 Le Temps 'HFFODLPHGWKDWWKH%ULWLVKSUHVV¶XQDQLPRXVO\DSSURYHV·WKHDWWLWXGHDVVXPHGE\WKH
French government in light of the Italian demands. Corbin described the tone of the British press as one 
WKDW¶ZHFDQFRQVLGHUDVYHU\VDWLVIDFWRU\·&RUELQWR Bonnet, 3 Dec. 1938, MAE, Série Z, Italie, no. 309. 
54 For example, Pertinax (André Géraud), writing in the Journal des débats, politiques et littéraires, 17 Dec. 1938. 
55 Daily Herald, editorial, 17 Dec. 1938. 
56 Duff Cooper, Evening Standard, 6 Dec. 1938; Vansittart minute (for Halifax), 19 Dec. 1938, TNA, FO 
371/22922/C358/281/17. 
57 Fraser to Phipps, 22 & 23 Dec. 1938, TNA, CAB 21/555. 
58 Bonnet, to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber of Deputies, 14 Dec. 1938, cited in 
Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, 251. 
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IV 
 
7KH¶ZDUVFDUH·RI-DQuary 1939 stemmed from intelligence that Hitler might, contrary to 
previous assumptions, aim ¶DQRYHUZKHOPLQJEORZDWWKH:HVWHUQ3RZHUV·59 These 
rumours exacerbated fears of French isolationism, adding weight to French pressure for 
conscription. Indeed, iWKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDW¶ERJXVLQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHGE\WKH
)UHQFKDXWKRULWLHVYLDWKH3DULV(PEDVV\·FRQWULEXWHGWR%ULWLVKIHDUVRID*HUPDQDWWDFN
in the west.60 For Paris, the British decision in December to implement only a voluntary 
system of national service was inadequate, not only lacking an element of compulsion but 
also focusing on passive defence rather than an expeditionary force. When Corbin raised 
WKLVFRQFHUQ:LOOLDP6WUDQJKHDGRIWKHIRUHLJQRIILFHFHQWUDOGHSDUWPHQWUHWRUWHG¶LW
was quite impossible for us in any immediate future to provide equipment for any larger 
ODQGFRQWULEXWLRQWKDQZHKDGDWSUHVHQWHQYLVDJHG· This echoed the current position of 
WKHFDELQHWZKHUH+DOLID[·VDUJXPHQWVLQIDYRXURIFRPSXOVLRQIDLOHGWRVKDNH
ChambHUODLQ·VFRQYLFWLRQWKDW¶WKHUHFRXOGEHLQIDFWQRSRVVLELOLW\RI%ULWDLQODQGLQJD
ODUJHDUP\RQWKHFRQWLQHQW·61 
1RQHWKHOHVVWKH¶ZDUVFDUH·LPSHOOHGWKHIRUHLJQRIILFHWRUH-evaluate the benefits 
of conscription. Vansittart needed little persuading, UHPLQGLQJ+DOLID[¶WKDW$QJOR-
French relations will be in severe danger and the capacity of French resistance will 
UDSLGO\EHH[KDXVWHGXQOHVVZHJUHDWO\LQFUHDVHRXUPLOLWDU\FRQWULEXWLRQ·62 Again, 
9DQVLWWDUW·VYLHZVZHUHVXSSRUWHGE\QHZVIURP3DULV As Dockrill has noted, French 
OREE\LQJRI¶&RORQHO:63LOFKHUDQG.HQQHWKGH&RXUF\QHZVSDSHUSURSULHWRUDQG
VHFUHWDU\RIWKHLPSHULDOGHIHQFHOHDJXHZKHQWKH\YLVLWHG3DULVLQ-DQXDU\·IXHOOHGIHDUV
of potential French isolation.63 Indeed, Pilcher and dH&RXUF\·Vreport noted how Alexis 
Léger, secretary-JHQHUDODWWKH4XDLG·2UVD\ ¶UHODWHGDOPRVWWKHZKROHRI)UHQFKIRUHLJQ
policy to the question of what contribution of a military character Great Britain might be 
                                                 
59 &DELQHW&RPPLWWHHRQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\-DQ¶3RVVLEOH*HUPDQ,QWHQWLRQV·71$)2
371/22961/C939/15/18. 
60 *O\Q6WRQH¶)URP(QWHQWHWR$OOLDQFH$QJOR-French relations, 1935-·LQ$ODQ6KDUSand Glyn 
Stone (eds.), Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation, (London: Routledge,  
2000), 195. )RUPRUHRQWKH¶ZDUVFDUHV·VHH0DUWLQ6$OH[DQGHU¶/HVUpDFWLRQVjODPHQDFHVWUDWpJLTXH
allemande en Europe occidentale: La Grande-%UHWDJQHOD%HOJLTXHHWOH´FDV+ROODQGHµGpFHPEUH²  
IpYULHU·&DKLHUVG·+LVWRLUHGHOD6HFRQGH*XHUUH0RQGLDOH, 7 (1982), 5-38. 
61 Strang to Phipps, 28 Jan. 1939, TNA, WO 208/2037A; Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, 23 Jan. 
1939, TNA, CAB 27/264. 
62 Vansittart minute (for Halifax), 24 Jan. 1939, TNA, FO 371/22922/C940/28/17. 
63 Dockrill, British Establishment Perspectives on France, 124. 
 13 
 
SUHSDUHGWRPDNH·64 Furthermore, both Gamelin and the military governor of 
Strasbourg, General Pierre Héring, spoke in the same terms to Hore-Belisha during the 
latter·V visit to the Maginot Line that same month.65 Such reports confirmed the 
conclusion already reached by the Chiefs of Staff: ¶)UDQFH·VVXUYLYDODVD(XURSHDQSRZHU
LVFRQGLWLRQDOXSRQKHUEHLQJDEOHWRFRXQWRQ%ULWDLQ·VVXSSRUWLQDQ\FRQWLQJHQF\WKDW
PD\DULVH·66 Consequently, they advocated an increase in the size of the BEF as well as 
full staff talks between the two countries.  
)RU3DULVWKLVSURYLGHGDQRWKHURSSRUWXQLW\WRHPSKDVLVH¶WKDWUHFRXUVHWR
conscription is the essential element of an effective British contribution to common 
GHIHQFH·67 1RQHWKHOHVVD4XDLG·2UVD\QRWHDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW%ULWLVKSXEOLFdemand 
for conscription was not yet overwhelming, and that the hostility of certain sections of 
British opinion remained problematic. Even those newspapers most explicitly in favour 
of augmenting the army, notably the Daily Express and the Yorkshire Post, were wary of 
overtly advocating conscription. In the present climate of opinion, concluded the Quai 
G·2UVD\¶LWZRXOGEHYDLQWRKRSHWKDWWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWZLOOVSRQWDQHRXVO\WDNH
WKHLQLWLDWLYH·68 7KHLUFRQFOXVLRQZDVERUQHRXWE\/RQGRQ·VUHVSRQVHWRD)Uench aide-
mémoire of 1 February that again implored the introduction of conscription. Strang 
simply suggested that the reference to conscription ¶VKRXOGEHLJQRUHG·1RQHWKHOHVVhe 
acknowledged WKDW%ULWDLQ·VDWWLWXGHUHTXLUHGUH-evaluation. The longstanding reluctance 
WRFRPPLWWR)UDQFHKHUHPDUNHGKDGEHHQEDVHGRQWKHSROLF\RI¶QRPRUH
FRPPLWPHQWV·DQGDODWHQWGLVWUXVWRI)UDQFH+RZHYHU¶WKHVHGD\VKDYHQRZORQJ
SDVVHG·DQGDIDLOXUHWRFRPPLWWR)UDQFHPLJKWSXVKVHFWLRQVRI)UHQFKRSLQLRQ
towards advocating the abandonment of existing commitments, including obligations to 
Britain. Cadogan concurred, and wanted to reassure the French: ¶,NQRZDOOWKH
REMHFWLRQVDERXW´SXWWLQJRXUIRUHLJQSROLF\LQWKHKDQGVRIWKH)UHQFK*RYWµ But 
again, in theVHGD\VLVWKHUHPXFKULVNLQWKDW"·69 
Under considerable pressure, Chamberlain informed the Commons on 6 
)HEUXDU\WKDW¶DQ\WKUHDWWRWKHYLWDOLQWHUHVWVRI)UDQFHIURPZKDWHYHUTXDUWHULWFDPH
                                                 
64 Notes for Cadogan on the visit of Pilcher and de Courcy to Paris, 27 Jan. 1939, TNA, FO 
&/pJHU·VH[SUHVVHGVLPLODURSLQLRQVWR(DUOGHOD:DUU¶1RWHIRUWKH6HFUHWDU\
RI6WDWH·)HE&KXUFKLOO$UFKLYHV&HQWUH&$&&DPEULGge, Phipps Papers, PHPP I 5/7. 
65 Dockrill, British Establishment Perspectives on France, 125. 
66 A general staff paper of 7 Jan. FLWHGLQ,POD\¶7KH0DNLQJRIWKH$QJOR-)UHQFK$OOLDQFH· 
67 Note, Directeur politique, 29 Jan. 1939, MAE, Papiers 1940: Cabinet Georges Bonnet, no. 2. 
68 Note ² conscription en Angleterre (le sous-GLUHFWHXUG·(XURSH30 Jan. 1939, MAE, Papiers 1940: 
Papiers Rochat, no. 18. 
69 French aide-mémoire for the British government, 1 Feb. 1939, TNA, FO 371/22963/C1318/15/18, and 
minutes by Strang and Cadogan, both 4 Feb. 1939. 
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must evoke the immediate co-RSHUDWLRQRIWKLVFRXQWU\·70 This declaration of Franco-
British solidarity provoked an almost euphoric reaction in the French press,71 and 
certainly delighted the French government. Indeed, Bonnet had urged Corbin to impress 
upon Halifax the need for such a statement.72 However, the conscription decision 
continued to elude them, and representations of British public opinion dissuaded them 
from pressurising London too strongly. Corbin warned that significant sections of British 
RSLQLRQFRQWLQXHGWRIHHOWKH¶JUHDWHVWUHSXJQDQFH·WRZDUGVconscription, ensuring that 
WKHJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGHQFRXQWHU¶YHU\VHULRXVGLIILFXOWLHVRQWKHGD\LWGHFLGHVWR
HVWDEOLVKLWLQSHDFHWLPH·73 $OWKRXJK&RUELQ·VDSSUDLVDOZDVGRXEWOHVVLQIOXHQFHGE\WKH
persistent hostility of the British left, it was the lack of explicit support for compulsory 
service that was most worrying. In early 1939, calls for the introduction of conscription 
were barely evident in the British press, with most newspapers content to await the 
outcome of the voluntary system. Indeed, the only newspapers consistently in favour of 
conscription ² the Evening Standard and Daily Express ² were equally voluble in espousing 
isolationism.74 )XUWKHUPRUHDVWHQVLRQVFUHDWHGE\WKH¶ZDUVFDUH·EHJDQWRGLVVLSDWH
political support for conscription diminished and the issue faded into the background. 
+RZHYHUWKLVZDVWRGUDPDWLFDOO\FKDQJHLQ0DUFKDV+LWOHU·VPDQRHXYULQJVLQ&HQWUDO
Europe fundamentally altered the diplomatic landscape. 
 
V 
 
The German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 destroyed most 
remaining illusions regarding appeasement, and both British and French opinion 
demanded a firm response. Public disillusionment with appeasement had been evident 
for several months - at least since Munich - but it was the events of March 1939 that 
crystallized opinion. With appeasement seemingly defunct, Britain had to demonstrate a 
determination to halt Nazism by force, proving that she was both able and willing to 
uphold the guarantees provided to Poland, Greece and Romania in the immediate 
aftermath of the Prague coup. Conscription was increasingly seen as an ideal gesture. As 
                                                 
70 343 H. C. Deb. 5s, col. 623. 
71 For example, Pierre Brossolette in Le Populaire, 7 Feb. 1939, Gabriel Péri in Humanité, 7 Feb. 1939, Pierre 
Bernus in the Journal des débats, politiques et littéraires, 8 Feb. 1939, and Le Temps¶/DVROLGDULWpGHOD)UDQFHHW
GHO·$QJOHWHUUH·)HE 
72 Bonnet to Corbin, 5 Feb. 1939, Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF), 2nd ser., XIV, no. 40. 
73 Corbin to Bonnet, 7 Feb. 1939, DDF, 2nd ser., XIV, no. 65. 
74 The Daily Express )HEVWDWHGWKDWWKHFRXQWU\¶LVXWWHUO\RSSRVHG·WRWKHLGHDRIVHQGLQJDQ
army to the continent. 
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Hore-Belisha noted on 28 March: ¶5HFHQWHYHQWVKDGFRQYLQFHGPHWKDWZHZRXOGKDYH
WRKDYHFRQVFULSWLRQ·75 6LPLODUO\&DGRJDQZDVSHUVXDGHGWKDW¶ZHmust do something about 
RXUPLOLWDU\VWUHQJWK>«@Lt is the test by which other countries (including Germany) will 
MXGJH·76 
Greater cabinet support encouraged Halifax, who had argued back in February 
that conscription ¶ZLOOKDYHDWUHPHQGRXVPRUDOHIIHFWLQ)UDQFH·77 After the Prague 
coup, reports from the Paris embassy indicated that the French clamour was 
intensifying.78 Indeed, French newspapers joining the chorus for conscription to an 
unprecedented extent,79 whilst German and Italian newspapers mocked the british 
SXEOLF·V unwillingness to embrace compulsory military service. André François-Poncet, 
the French ambassador in Rome, reported how the Italian press consistently highlighted 
the lack of British conscription, an observation echoed by his British counterpart, Lord 
Perth. On 31 March, the latter cited an article from the SUHYLRXVGD\·V Tribuna¶$UPV
guns, pounds, aeroplanes, the home fleet, yes; cRQVFULSWLRQQR·80 
The foreign office was evidently persuaded that British conscription would have 
a profound effect on the dictators, one official suggesting WKDW¶QDWLRQDOVHUYLFHLVWKHEHVW
ZHDSRQZHFDQXVHWRLPSUHVV0XVVROLQLWKDWZHPHDQEXVLQHVV·+RZHYHUSRWHQWLDO
GRPHVWLFUHSHUFXVVLRQVUHPDLQHGWURXEOLQJDQGWKHOHIW·VDWWLWXGHZDVLQFUHDVLQJO\
exasperating those in favour of conscription. As another foreign office official lamented: 
¶WKHSHRSOHZKRDUHORXGHVWLQWKHGHPDQGIRUVWURQJDFWLRQUHIXVHWRWDNHWKHRQH
measure calculated to annoy and confound the dictators. Even Russia, which is held up 
as the pattern of democracy, has undemocratic compXOVRU\VHUYLFH·81 The persistent 
hostility of the British left compelled Corbin to remind Paris that whilst compulsory 
VHUYLFHZDVDQXQTXHVWLRQHG)UHQFKWUDGLWLRQ¶WKHSV\FKRORJLFDODWPRVSKHUHLVQRWWKH
VDPH·LQ%ULWDLQ82 7KLVFRQWUDVWLQJ¶SV\FKRORJLFDO DWPRVSKHUH·DODUPHGWKH French left. 
                                                 
75 Diary entry for 28 Mar. 1939, in R. J. Minney, ed., The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, (Aldershot: Gregg 
Revivals, 1991), 187. 
76 Diary entry for 28 Mar. 1939, in David Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-45, (London: 
Cassell, 1971), 164. 
77 +DOLID[¶6WUDWHJLF3RVLWLRQRI)UDQFHLQ5HODWLRQWRWKH5{OHRIWKH%ULWLVK$UP\LQ:DU·)HE
TNA, FO 371/22922/C2192/281/17. 
78 Phipps to Halifax, 16 Mar. 1939, TNA, FO 371/22993/C3227/19/18. 
79 For example, La République, 21 Mar. 1939; Intransigeant, 24 & 29 Mar. 1939. 
80 François-Poncet to Bonnet, 29 Mar. 1939, MAE, Série Z, Allemagne, no. 724; Perth to Halifax, 31 Mar. 
1939, TNA, FO 371/23076/C4593/3778/18. 
81 Minutes by Roberts and Kirkpatrick, both 4 Apr. 1939, TNA, FO 371/23076/C4593/3778/18. 
82 Corbin to Bonnet, 29 Mar. 1939, DDF, 2nd ser., XV, no. 195. 
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$V3KLSSVQRWHG¶Wo the French Trade Unionist, as to all his compatriots, the idea that 
FRQVFULSWLRQVKRXOGEHXQGHPRFUDWLFLVLPSRVVLEOHWRJUDVS·83  
On the British right, however, recourse to conscription was increasingly 
advocated. On 29 March thirty Conservative dissidents, including Churchill and Duff 
Cooper, tabled a motion calling for conscription to be introduced.84 Several days earlier, 
the 1922 Committee had expressed support for compulsory service, a fact not lost on 
Corbin.85 For Paris, these signs offered hope that a favourable decision was imminent. 
However, the British continued to emphasize that implementing conscription would be 
problematic; Halifax informed %RQQHWRI¶WKHGLIILFXOWLHVDULVLQJDQGKRZJUDve might be 
the repercussions on the whole strength and capacity of this country if they were rudely 
KDQGOHG·86 /RQGRQ·VDQ[LHWLHVZHUHXQGHUVWDQGDEOHJLYHQWKHvoluble hostility of the far-
left. The communist Daily Worker questioned the need for conscription in predictably 
evocative and ideologically-PRWLYDWHGUKHWRULF¶6HUYLFHIRUWKHWUDLWRUVZKRKDYHEXLOWXS
Hitler and Mussolini to the point where they can kill more British workers than the 
Kaiser killed on the Somme? Service for the Labour leaders who have backed these 
WUDLWRUV"·87 
This latter point, however, illustrates that leftist opposition was not unanimous. 
Indeed, there was a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the more militant trade 
unions and the communists, and on the other, the leadership of both the Labour Party 
and the TUC. Certainly, much of the trade union and Labour opposition lacked 
FRQYLFWLRQ$V+XJK'DOWRQODWHUDFNQRZOHGJHG¶,GLGQRWEHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHZDVPXFK
deep-VHDWHGRSSRVLWLRQWRFRQVFULSWLRQ·88 Furthermore, prominent figures within the 
Labour movement attempted to change attitudes within the Parliamentary Labour Party 
3/3$V'RXJODV-D\UHFDOOHGKHDQG+XJK*DLWVNLOOIHDUHGWKDWWKH3/3ZRXOG¶PDNHD
fool of itself by demanding resistance to Hitler and voting against conscription at the 
VDPHWLPH·&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH\¶GHYLVHGDVFKHPHWRDYHUWWKLVDQGVXFFHVVIXOO\VROGLWWR
'DOWRQ·89 This scheme focused on winning the Labour leadership·VVXSSRUW for 
conscription in exchange for a quid pro quo by way of the conscription of wealth. 
                                                 
83 Phipps to Halifax, 4 Apr. 1939, TNA, FO 371/22909/C5010/25/17. 
84 Crowson, Facing Fascism, 164-5; Dennis, Decision by Default, 198. 
85 Corbin to Bonnet, 22 Mar. 1939, MAE, Série Z, Allemagne, no. 724. 
86 Despatch to the cKDUJpG·DIIDLUHVLQ3DULVUHJDUGLQJFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQ+DOLID[DQG%RQQHW0DU
1939, TNA, FO 800/311. 
87 Daily Worker, editorial, 29 Mar. 1939. 
88 Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931-1945, (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1957), 254. 
89 Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune: A Political Record, (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 78-9. See also 
5LFKDUG7R\H¶7KH/DERXU3DUW\DQGWKH(FRQRPLFVRI5HDUPDPHQW-·Twentieth Century British 
History, Vol. 12, no. 3 (2001), 303-26. 
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Although Dalton and Attlee accepted the logic of this argument, the Labour leader was 
unable to sell the scheme to the PLP.90 Nevertheless, residual leftist opposition was 
overshadowed by the increasingly voluble campaign in favour oIFRQVFULSWLRQ¶>,@IWKH
FRXQWU\GHFLGHVWKDWLWPXVWKDYHFRQVFULSWLRQ·DUJXHGWKHDaily Mail¶WKHQIRU+HDYHQ·V
sake let us have conscription now·91 For French officials in London, public demand for 
conscription had reached new heights. As Lelong noteG¶WKHLGHDRIREOLJDWRU\VHUYLFH
KDVPDGHQRWDEOHSURJUHVV·0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\&RUELQUHPDUNHGKRZWKHFDPSDLJQKDG
assumed a very different character from that experienced after Munich. The inadequacies 
of the voluntary system had been exposed; compulsion was now being explicitly 
advocated.92 
Within the French press, both the Paris-Midi and Le Temps detected an evolution 
of British opinion in favour of obligatory service, as did Pertinax, who urged the British 
WRELWHWKHEXOOHW¶Courage, M. Britling, acceptez la conscription et la paix sera sauvée· 
Furthermore, the French left abandoned their previous reluctance to condemn their 
British counterparts. The communist Ce Soir questioned the confidence one could have 
in British firmness against the dictators whilst they refused recourse to compulsory 
service.93 The tone of the French press did not go unnoticed by British newspapers, with 
the Daily Mail, the Observer and the Sunday Times all noting that the French were anxious 
for Britain to introduce conscription without delay. Most tellingly, the isolationist Daily 
Express FRQFHGHGWKDWWKHFXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQSHUPLWWHGWKHP¶WRDFFHSWWKHDOOLDQFHZLWK
)UDQFHDVVRPHWKLQJFRPSDWLEOHZLWK,VRODWLRQ·,QGHHGLVRODWLRQFRXOGEHH[WHQGHGWR
WKH0DJLQRW/LQH¶WREHFRPHZKDWPD\EHFDOOHG´%LVRODWLRQµ·94 
In such a context, Michael +RZDUG·VDSSUDLVDORIthe decision taken at the end of 
March to double the size of the Territorial Army from 13 to 26 divisions ² that it was ¶D
response to the public mood, and as such ZDVZHOFRPHGE\YLUWXDOO\HYHU\RQH· ² is 
indisputable.95 However, as Phipps reported, the French were unimpressed, and calls for 
conscription remained ¶DFRPPRQSODFHRIDQ\QHZVSDSHUDUWLFOHRUFRQYHUVDWLRQDQG
was, I learned, impressed yesterday upon British journalists at the Ministry of Foreign 
                                                 
90 L. V. Scott, Conscription and the Attlee Governments: The Politics and Policy of National Service, 1945-1951, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 5. 
91 Duff Cooper, Evening Standard, 28 Mar. 1939; Daily Mail, editorial, 18 Mar. 1939. 
92 Lelong to Daladier, 24 Mar. 1939, DDF, 2nd ser., XV, no. 152; Corbin to Bonnet, 29 Mar. 1939, DDF, 
2nd ser., XV, no. 195. 
93 Paris-Midi, 14 Apr. 1939; Le Temps, 24 Apr. 1939; Pertinax, Ordre, 24 Apr. 1939 ; Paul Nizan, Ce Soir, 14 
Apr. 1939. 
94 Daily Mail, editorial, 21 Apr. 1939; Observer, Paris correspondent, 23 Apr. 1939; Sunday Times, Paris 
correspondent, 9 Apr. 1939; Daily Express, editorial, 30 Mar. 1939. 
95 Howard, The Continental Commitment, 129. 
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$IIDLUV· 6HYHUDOGD\VODWHU3KLSSVLQIRUPHG/RQGRQRI¶JUXPEOLQJLQWKHSURYLQFHVQR
less than in Paris; and feeling is so strong that it might affect French morale in a future 
FULVLV· In late April, a report fURPWKH%ULWLVKFRQVXODWHLQ6WUDVERXUJQRWHGKRZ¶ORFDO
criticism of Great Britain ebbs and flows in proportion to press reports on the 
LPPLQHQFHRIRXUDGRSWLRQRIFRQVFULSWLRQ·96 Although Chamberlain appeared relatively 
unconcerned by French opinion, hiVFDELQHWFRXOGQRWEHLJQRUHG¶2XUSHRSOH·KH
UHPDUNHG¶ZHUHJHWWLQJYHU\ZRUNHGXSDERXWFRQVFULSWLRQ·DOWKRXJKKHKLPVHOI¶FDPH
GRZQIODWIRRWHGDJDLQVWLW·97 On 18 April, Hore-Belisha recorded how Chamberlain 
DFFXVHGKLPRIKDYLQJ¶DEHHLQP\ERQQHWDERXWFRQVFULSWLRQ·98 However, Chamberlain 
was finding himself increasingly isolated. Paris thus sensed that the tide had turned, and 
that one last push would suffice for the British to finally succumb. 
     
VI 
 
By April 1939, as Roger Broad has observeG¶LQFUHDVLQJUHVWLYHQHVVLQ)UDQFHDERXW
%ULWLVKSROLF\GHPDQGHGPRUHSRVLWLYHDFWLRQ·99 On 18 April, Daladier informed Phipps 
in no uncertain terms of his desire to see conscription implemented in Britain, arguing 
WKDWLWZRXOGKDYHD¶SURSLWLRXVHIIHFW LQ)UDQFH·DVZHOODVIXUQLVKLQJ¶DQH[FHOOHQW
DUJXPHQWIRUWKHSROLWLFDOQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKH8665· The following day, pressure 
emerged from another quarter when the American ambassador in Paris, William Bullitt, 
WROG3KLSSVWKDW3UHVLGHQW5RRVHYHOW¶IHOWYHU\VWURQJO\WKDWLWZDVDEVROXWHO\HVVHQWLDO·
that conscription is introduced.100 ¶7KH)UHQFKDUHSUHVVLQJXVVWURQJO\·QRWHG2OLYHU
+DUYH\+DOLID[·VSULYDWHVHFUHWDU\¶DQGZHKHDUWKDWHYHQ5RRVHYHOWLVGLVPD\HGWKDWZH
KDYHQ·W\HWWDNHQWKLVVWHS·.101 By the time the former secretary of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey, VXJJHVWHGWKDW¶Whe French are a little overdoing 
the pressure about National Service·102, Chamberlain had already decided to introduce a 
form of conscription. In a letter to his sister he applauded himself for correctly 
                                                 
96 Phipps to Halifax, 12 Apr. and 14 Apr. 1939, TNA, FO 371/23077/C5132/3778/18; Report from the 
British Consulate at Strasbourg, 26 Apr. 1939, TNA, FO 371/22909/C6506/25/17. 
97 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 Apr. 1939, Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham, Special 
Collections Department, NC 18/1/1092. 
98 Minney, ed., The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, 196. 
99 Roger Broad, Conscription in Britain, 1939-1964: The Militarisation of a Generation, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006), 90. 
100 1RWHVPDQXVFULWHVG·eGRXDUG'DODGLHU$1 Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/10, 2 DA 5 Dr. 5, sdrd; Phipps 
to Halifax, 20 Apr. 1939, CAC, Phipps Papers, PHPP I 1/22. 
101 Diary entry for 19 Apr. 1939, in John Harvey, ed., The Diplomatic Diaries of Sir Oliver Harvey 1937-1940, 
(London: John Harvey, 1970), 281. 
102 Hankey to Phipps, 24 Apr. 1939, CAC, Phipps Papers, PHPP I 3/3. 
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LQWHUSUHWLQJWKHPRRGRIWKHSHRSOH¶,EHOLHYHZHKLWRQWKHULJKWPRPHQWZKHQSXEOLF
opinion was ripe for the move and when the foreigners would not have been satisfied to 
ZDLWIRULWPXFKORQJHU·103 
 Why Chamberlain finally succumbed in April 1939 remains contentious. 
Evidently, the combination of French and domestic pressure had intensified considerably 
during the autumn and winter of 1938-39, and the introduction of conscription certainly 
did give Chamberlain a respite.104 However, military considerations must not be 
overlooked. As Len Scott has noted¶WKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGSDUWLFXODUO\&KDPEHUODLQ
EHFDPHREVHVVHGZLWKWKHIHDURIDVXGGHQ*HUPDQNQRFNRXWEORZIURPWKHDLU·105 After 
the Prague coup, Chamberlain viewed conscription as a necessary instrument for 
DXJPHQWLQJ%ULWDLQ·VDQWL-aircraft defences. Nevertheless, one cannot imagine that 
Chamberlain would have taken such a step were it not for the fusion of French and 
domestic pressure.  
The need to reassure Paris was certainly pivotal in the British decision. As 
Cadogan noted, when Phipps LQIRUPHGWKH)UHQFKRIWKHQHZV¶[t]hey burst into tears 
and flung their arms round his neck and agreed to anything ZHOLNHG·106 Of course, public 
support for conscription was not unanimous, and the government anticipated 
considerable difficulties in implementing it. In justifying the decision before the trade 
XQLRQVLWZDVDUJXHGWKDW¶WKHPDUFKRIHYHQWV·- which included ¶SUHVVXUHIURPWKH
French, as well as froPDOPRVWDOOTXDUWHUVRI(XURSH·- had made it ¶impossible any 
longer to neglect this further means of strengthening our defenceV·.107 Nevertheless, 
opposition was unavoidable, reflecting the deep-rooted hostility of many on the left. The 
Daily Herald deplored how: ¶ZLWKRXWUHIHUHQFHWRSXEOLFRSLQLRQZLWKRXWFRQVXOWDWLRQRI
DQ\NLQGFRQVFULSWLRQLVLPSRVHGXSRQWKHFRXQWU\· The Daily Worker was predictably 
PRUHH[SOLFLWFRQGHPQLQJFRQVFULSWLRQDV¶DZD\RIILJKWLQJWKH%ULWLVKZRUNLQJ-classes 
while the British ruling-FODVVHVPDNHDGHDOZLWK+LWOHU·108   
Leftist dissent was also voiced in parliament. Chamberlain tried to pre-empt 
FULWLFLVPIURPWKHOHIWE\FLWLQJWKH)UHQFK&RPPXQLVW*DEULHO3pUL¶,WLVLPSRVVLEOHWR
contest the importance of the British GHFLVLRQ·3pULKDGZULWWHQ¶$VORQJDVWKLVGHFLVLRQ
                                                 
103 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 29 Apr. 1939, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1096. 
104 Broad, Conscription in Britain, 1939-1964, 93. 
105 Scott, Conscription and the Attlee Governments, 2. For more on the fear of air attack, see Uri Bialer, The 
Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1939, (London: Royal Historical Society, 
1980). 
106 Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 176 (original emphasis). 
107 Notes for TUC, 24 Apr. 1939, TNA, CAB 21/1264. 
108 Daily Worker, editorial, 26 Apr. 1939; Daily Herald, editorial, 27 Apr. 1939. 
 20 
 
ZDVQRWWDNHQ%ULWDLQ·VSURPLVHVWR3RODQG5RPDQLDDQG*UHHFHZHUHRIDPRUH
V\PEROLFWKDQSUDFWLFDOFKDUDFWHU·7KLVFXWOLWWOHLFHZLWKWKHRSSRVLWLRQ$VVRRQDV
Chamberlain mentioned Péri, the sole communist MP, William Gallacher, interjected: ¶,
UHSXGLDWHKLPULJKWDZD\·7KH/DERXUOHDGHU&OHPHQW$Wtlee, also opposed the decision. 
¶)ar from strengthening this country·, he argued, ¶it will weaken it and divide it, at a time 
when it should be VWURQJDQGXQLWHG·7KH/LEHUDOOHDGHU6LU$UFKLEDOG6LQFODLUZDVOHVV
vociferous, simply lamenting the lack of consultation with the opposition and trade 
unions.109 Indeed, despite traditional Liberal opposition to conscription, the party had 
consistently failed to adopt a coherent position, a fact reflected in the Parliamentary vote. 
Although seven Liberal MPs opposed the conscription bill, six lent their support.110  
Overall, criticism was remarkably subdued. The Labour party arguably faced 
more criticism for opposing conscription than the government encountered in 
introducing it. The Daily Mirror GHVFULEHG/DERXU·VRSSRVLWLRQDV¶LOORJLFDO·ZKLOVWWKH
Observer VXJJHVWHGWKDW¶DPDMRULW\RIWKHFRXQWU\LVDJDLQVWWKHP·111 The liberal 
newspapers, which had previously been reluctant to express an opinion on the issue of 
conscription, also accepted the decision. The Manchester Guardian initially sympathised 
with leftist REMHFWLRQVEXWVRRQDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW¶%ULWLVKFRQVFULSWLRQLVQRZDQ
essential component of the Peace Front in which, far more sincerely than the 
*RYHUQPHQWWKH2SSRVLWLRQSDUWLHVEHOLHYH·112 Sinclair echoed this view in the 
&RPPRQVFRQFHGLQJWKDWFRQVFULSWLRQ¶KDVEHFRPH² wrongly as I think, but I have to 
face the fact it has become ² a symbRODEURDGRI%ULWLVKVWUHQJWKDQGSXUSRVH·113   
$OWKRXJK/DERXU·VRSSRVLWLRQZDVPRUHVXVWDLQHGLWWRRUDSLGO\VXEVLGHG$WWKH 
SDUW\·V annual conference in Southport at the end of May, a resolution calling for non-
cooperation with the bill was comfortably defeated.114 Similarly, hostility among the trade 
union leadership quickly dissipated once the bill had been passed. As Alan Bullock has 
noted, although Ernest Bevin ZDVDQJU\WKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWKDG¶EURXJKWLQ
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FRQVFULSWLRQE\WKHEDFNGRRUDQGWULHGWR´SXWLWRYHUµRQWKHZRUNLQJFODVV·KH
subsequently ¶H[HUWHGKLVLQIOXHQFHDJDLQVWWKRVHZKRZDQWHGWKH/DERXUPRYHPHQWWR
withdraw from all co-operation in defence preparations [and had little] patience with left-
wing talk of industrial action to resist coQVFULSWLRQ·115 FurthermoreWKH78&·VJHQHUDO
secretary, Sir Walter Citrine, noted RQ0D\WKDWWKH¶GDQJHURXVLQWHUQDWLRQDOVLWXDWLRQ
KDGWREHERUQHLQPLQG·DQGWKDWWKHWUDGHXQLRQPRYHPHQW¶ZDVFRPPLWWHGWR
DGHTXDWHQDWLRQDOGHIHQFH·116 Even the more militant trade unions, notably the influential 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), reacted ambiguously to the conscription 
decision and ultimately rejected protesting with industrial action. As Imlay concludes, 
ZKHQ¶WKHLVVXHRIPLOLWDU\FRQVFULSWLRQFRPpelled AEU leaders to choose, their hostility 
WRIDVFLVPHDVLO\WRRNSULRULW\RYHUWKHLUKRVWLOLW\WRLQGXVWU\DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW·117 
Leftist opposition was also undermined by the criticism of French socialists. 
Léon Blum noted the contradiction between advocating a firmer foreign policy whilst 
denying Britain the strength necessary to enforce it. The trade unionist Le Peuple 
FRQFXUUHGUHJUHWWLQJ¶WKDWZHDUHQRWLQDFFRUGZLWKWKH%ULWLVK/DERXUOHDGHUV·Overall, 
the Paris-Midi was correct in asserting that %ULWLVKVRFLDOLVWVKDGUHFHLYHG¶DVKDUSGUHVVLng 
GRZQ·IURPDOOTXDUWHUVRIWKH)UHQFKOHIW.118 On the whole, the French press welcomed 
the conscription decision with gratitude and delight. Le Matin remarked that when 
French coQVFULSWVFU\¶%UDYRO·$QJOHWHUUH·WKH\VSHDNIRUWKHZKROHRI)UDQFHLe Figaro 
GHVFULEHGFRQVFULSWLRQDV¶DIDU-UHDFKLQJPDWHULDODQGPRUDOJHVWXUH·119 3KLSSV·VDSSUDLVDO
- WKDW%ULWLVKFRQVFULSWLRQKDGEHHQ¶HQWKXVLDVWLFDOO\ZHOFRPHGE\QHZVSDSHUVRIDOl 
SDUWLHV·² was no exaggeration.120 $V&RUELQKDGSUHGLFWHGWKHGHFLVLRQ¶ZLOOKDYH
immense reverberations across the world, particularly in France where it has been 
DZDLWHGZLWKVXFKDQ[LHW\· In terms of Franco-%ULWLVKUHODWLRQVWKH4XDLG·2UVD\
suggestHGWKDW¶7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI%ULWLVKFRQVFULSWLRQPDUNVDWODVWDQHZSKDVHRQ
WKHFRPPRQSDWKSXUVXHGE\)UDQFHDQG*UHDW%ULWDLQ·.121   
                                                 
115 Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. 1: Trade Union Leader, 1881-1940, (London: 
Heinemann, 1960), 637-8. Bevin continued his attempts to overcome traditional Labour hostility to 
conscription in the late 1940s (see Scott, Conscription and the Attlee Governments, 32-42, Frank Myers, 
¶&RQVFULSWLRQDQGWKH3ROLWLFVRI0LOLWDU\6WUDWHJ\LQWKH$WWOHH*RYHUQPHQW·Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 
7, no. 1 (1984), 55-73, and Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, (London: Heinemann, 
1983), 395-400)). 
116 Cited in Imlay, Facing the Second World War, 215. 
117 Imlay, Facing the Second World War, 334. 
118 Léon Blum, Le Populaire, 27 Apr. 1939; Léon Harmel, Le Peuple, 27 Apr. 1939; Paris-Midi, 27 Apr. 1939. 
119 Le Matin$SU:ODGLPLUG·2UPHVVRQLe Figaro, 27 Apr. 1939. 
120 Phipps to Halifax, 27 Apr. 1939, TNA, FO 371/23077/C6053/3778/18. 
121 Corbin to Bonnet, 26 Apr. 1939, DDF, 2nd ser. vol. XV, no. 497; Sous-GLUHFWHXUG·(XURSH$SU
² untitled document, detailing Franco-British relations, MAE, Papiers 1940, Papiers Rochat, no. 18. 
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Ultimately, the most telling impact of the conscription decision was the positive 
effect it had on the French. Materially, conscription did not immediately facilitate the 
despatch of a larger continental force, as the majority of the new recruits were intended 
to man anti-aircraft defences rather than bolster an Expeditionary Force.122 Furthermore, 
conscription required considerable reorganisation of the British army (which was already 
struggling to facilitate its recent expansion) and an influx of men did not necessarily 
mean an increase or improvement in equipment.123 The limited scope of the bill, which 
applied only to those men aged 20 and 21, suggests further that it was a moral rather than 
a material commitment to the continent. Indeed, the key limitation of the bill was that 
men were only to be trained for six months, far from sufficient for furnishing a well-
trained field force intended for continental despatch. Indeed, the pro-conscription 
newspapers were quick to criticise the limitations of the Bill, the Daily Express 
FRQVLGHULQJLWD¶KDOIPHDVXUH·DYLHZHFKRHGLQWKHEvening Standard and the Daily Mail.124  
ThereIRUHDV5RJHU%URDGKDVFRQFOXGHG¶WKHJHVWXUHZDVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQ
WKHVXEVWDQFH·125 In terms of the impact it had on the dictators, the effects were also 
mixed. Although it did not deter Hitler, it was certainly a fine riposte to German and 
Italian aOOHJDWLRQVWKDW%ULWDLQZDVRQO\SUHSDUHGWR¶ILJKWWRWKHODVW)UHQFKPDQ·To be 
sure, even in its limited form the conscription bill satisfied much of the demand 
emanating from France. As the Paris-Soir UHPDUNHG¶%HUOLQZLOOQRORQJHUEHDEOHWRVD\
thaW%ULWDLQPDNHVZDUZLWKRWKHUFRXQWULHV·VROGLHUV·126 Indeed, when defending 
FRQVFULSWLRQLQWKH&RPPRQVWKHSULPHPLQLVWHUUHPDUNHG¶7KDWJLEHWKDW%ULWDLQZDV
´UHDG\WRILJKWWRWKHODVW)UHQFKVROGLHUµLVRQHWKDWKDVEHHQEDQGLHGDERXWIURPFDSLWDO
to capital. It has been becoming clearer and clearer to us that the success of our whole 
effort to build up a solid front against this idea of domination by force was being 
MHRSDUGLVHGE\WKHVHGRXEWV·127 
 
Without French pressure, it is highly unlikely that conscription would have been 
introduced in peacetime. However, French pressure would have been less persuasive if 
British public opinion had not become receptive to the idea of national service. 
                                                 
122 Scott, Conscription and the Attlee Governments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Moreover, the French campaign interacted with their perceptions of British opinion. In 
two distinct moments during 1938-9 ² firstly after the Munich Agreement and secondly 
in the immediate aftermath of the Prague coup ² Paris perceived an evolution of British 
opinion in favour of compulsory military service. Consequently, the French government 
intensified their pressure on the British government to augment their continental 
commitment, if only by the symbolic implementation of a limited form of conscription.  
7KHFRQVFULSWLRQ¶FRUHVDPSOH·DOVRVKRZVWKDWWKHLQFUHDVed assertiveness of the 
French government during 1938-9 was always contingent upon their perceptions of 
Britain. Although France adopted a politique de fermeté independently of the British 
government, the representations of British press and public opinion furnished by the 
London embassy reassured the Daladier government that their stance enjoyed 
considerable support in Britain. In sum, the French policymaking elites recognised that 
the British public were increasingly advocating a policy of resistance over appeasement, 
and that they were subsequently more favourable to conscription. Arguably, neither 
French pressure nor public demand was sufficient in itself to force Chamberlain to 
abandon his opposition. However, the two factors working in tandem ² a deliberate ploy 
RQ)UDQFH·VSDUW² provided a compelling argument for the introduction of British 
conscription. 
 
